IUU

The International Fight Against IUU fishing: Moving from criminal to social justice?

To mark the first International day for the fight against IUU fishing, CFFA's brief paper looks critically at the concept of IUU fishing and the policy ideas on how best to fight it. We argue that popular images of IUU fishing are misleading and fail to reflect the nature of the most serious  threats to coastal communities. A key aspect lies with the corrupt relationships between governments, political elites and businesses exploiting marine and coastal resources. Because of this, we argue that relying on 'criminal justice' as a solution is insufficient for coastal communities and small-scale fishers. 

You can download the paper by clicking here.

Review of the new Greenpeace report: 'Scam on the African Coast'

A report published today by Greenpeace exposes widespread fraud involving Chinese companies fishing in West Africa, both with vessels flying the Chinese flag and vessels operating under joint ventures. Based on information obtained by Greenpeace primarily in Senegal, Guinea Bissau and the Republic of Guinea (Conakry), the report shows that China’s biggest distant water fishing company, the China National Fisheries Corporation (CNFC), as well as other Chinese companies, have systematically under-declared the gross tonnage (GT) of their fishing vessels for years.

Under-declaring the tonnage of vessels amounts to fishing illegally, according both to the legislation of the coastal and flag States involved and the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing. According to Greenpeace, this pervasive form of IUU fishing has been going on for almost 30 years and involves responsibilities at various levels, both in China and in the coastal countries involved.

Greenpeace calculated that, from 2000 to 2014, CNFC under-declared the GT of its vessels to the Senegalese authorities by 43% on average annually compared to their actual GT. In 2014 alone, CNFC has fraudulently hidden a total of 1742 GT through GT fraud.

This fraudulent practice by CNFC also occurs in Guinea Bissau and Guinea and involves other Chinese companies. For 59 CNFC vessels fishing in Senegal, Guinea Bissau and Guinea in 2014, evidence was found showing that the GT of 44 vessels was under-declared. In total, 6757.7 GT have been hidden from these coastal States, which represents approximately adding an equivalent of 22 extra industrial fishing vessels with a capacity of 300 GT each into their waters.

License fees are calculated on the basis of the GT, so companies that under-declare the GT of their vessels are depriving coastal States’ governments of revenue. For example, the fraud represented an estimated shortfall for Senegal of at least 371,404,800 CFA Francs (566,203 EURO) in license fees, that CNFC avoided paying during the period 2000 to 2014[1].

It also allowed industrial vessels to gain access to local artisanal fishermen’s zone, where they shouldn't be fishing, as is the case in Senegal.

Under-declaring GT also means that the actual fishing capacity deployed is much higher than authorized and undermines fisheries management and conservation efforts by coastal States, as illustrated by the CNFC/Guinea Bissau agreement. According to the terms and conditions provided by the fisheries agreement signed between CNFC and Guinea Bissau in 2010, it appears that, in the first half of 2014 alone, CNFC vessels actual fishing capacity exceeded the authorized capacity limit by 61%.

The degree to which GT was under-reported also raises the question of how much of the reported catches by CNFC and other companies during that period were illegal. Considering that fish caught by Chinese companies has been sold, among others, on European markets, this highlights loopholes in EU current efforts to stop trading of IUU-caught fish.

Greenpeace concludes by underlining that it is of the utmost urgency that governments, both coastal and flag States involved, investigate the alleged fraud by Chinese fishing companies as well as the potential fraud by other industrial fishing companies with vessels fishing in their EEZs, whether foreign-flagged and/or owned/operated. In addition, all States involved should conduct a comprehensive assessment and publish the lists of fishing vessels operating in their waters and/or under their flag.

The link to the report 'Scam on the African Coast':  http://www.greenpeace.org/africa/Global/africa/graphics/Amigo/Scam%20on%20the%20African%20Coast%20FINAL%20PROOF(1).pdf

[1] These figures are doubtless under-estimated as it only includes data for 15 out of the 30 years of CNFC operations in Senegal alone, and only the part of the vessels for which GT could be estimated.

Delisting Korea from the EU 'IUU list': too much, too fast

On April 21st, the European Commission revised its list of countries that it considers fail to address illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

The EC put Thailand on formal notice ('yellow card') for not taking sufficient measures in the international fight against illegal fishing (IUU). The EC also acknowledged that Korea and the Philippines 'carried appropriate reforms' of their legal system, which is now 'aligned with international law', enabling them to tackle IUU fishing. The EC therefore removed their yellow card.

CFFA feels that, in the case of Korea, this delisting may have come too soon. If indeed some reform of Korea’s legislation has been undertaken on paper to stop its distant water fleets from engaging in IUU operations, including Korean vessels fishing in West Africa , it is unclear whether and how much Korea intends to implement them.

From our information, it seems that several Korean trawlers fishing in West Africa have still recently been involved in illegal incursions in the artisanal fishing zone, including in a country like Guinea.

In 2013, Guinea was given a 'red card' by the EU, because it wasn't doing enough to fight IUU fishing; Guinea is, since then, banned from exporting fish products to the EU market. We are therefore now in a situation where a developing coastal State, Guinea, cannot export its fish on the EU market, whilst a distant water fishing nation, Korea, -which, in our view, has not yet given any concrete proof that it will indeed implement its new legislation and actually stop  illegal fishing by its fleets in West Africa-, is able to export to the EU the fish they catch in Guinean and other West African waters. This is an unfair situation, which seems to reflect the fact that trade considerations, - Korea being a key trading partner for the EU, unlike Guinea-, have led the EU to take this somewhat premature step of letting Korea off the hook.

We want to reiterate that, in West African countries, the first victims of illegal operations in coastal waters by trawlers, whether foreign- or locally-flagged, are small scale fishing communities. The fact that the EU has removed Korea’s yellow card, in the absence of any tangible results that the country will indeed implement its reforms, may not only lead to further damage to African coastal communities, but also set a dangerous precedent.

What incentive will there be for other distant water fishing nations and coastal nations to effectively protect their coastal communities from foreign trawlers illegal operations, if the message given by the EU is that the only thing to do to freely trade fish is ‘paper reform’?

At a time where we witness an important number of trawlers being reflagged from industrialised countries, – EU, China, Korea among others-, to developing countries, what will be the incentive to avoid ‘reflagging of convenience’ to escape stringent rules, if the message given today by the EU is that the only thing that matters is that the fight against IUU fishing looks good on paper?

Preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing activities that threaten West African coastal communities’ livelihoods should require concrete action, not merely papering over the cracks.

Presentations at Interpol’s meeting on IUU fishing confirm resistance to publishing information on licensing: Why?

In what sector with high rates of unlicensed activity would information on who is licensed be considered confidential in order to help fight corporate criminality? According to a presentation by the new chair of the 'Fish-I' project, that would be the fisheries sector in East Africa.